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THE OLD MORALITY LIVES ON IN ILLINOIS
Hewitt v. Hewitt
77 Il. 2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979)
In our society, men and women increasingly live together with
out benefit of a marriage ceremony.' When these relationships end,
problems of property rights frequently arise over the issue of whether
one cohabitant has any claim against property acquired by the other
cohabitant during the relationship. In Hewitt v. Hewitt,2 the Illinois
Supreme Court addressed this issue for the first time. Reversing a decision by the lower court, 3 the supreme court found that property claims
arising out of a cohabitational relationship were unenforceable because
the enforcement of such claims would violate public policy.4 One of
the main concerns of the Illinois Supreme Court was that recognition
of enforceable property rights in this situation would amount to judicial recognition of common law marriage. 5
This case comment will analyze the Hewitt decision in light of case
holdings from other jurisdictions concerning cohabitational property
rights. The law of contracts will be examined in the area of illegality
and public policy as applied in this case. It will be shown that the
Illinois Supreme Court reached an unjust result. Finally, attention will
be given to the methods cohabitants can use to order their financial
affairs to avoid the pitfalls of Hewitt.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

Prior to Hewitt, the question of property rights between two people
who have lived together without being married had not been addressed
in Illinois. However, similar cases had arisen in other states. 6 The ju1. Census figures for 1970 show about eight times as many couples living together without
being married as cohabited in 1960. Comment, In re Cary.- A JudicialRecognition of Il/cit Cohabitaion, 25 HASTINGS L.J. 1226, 1226 (1974).
2. 77 I11.2d 49, 394 N.E.2d 1204 (1979).
3. 62 I11. App. 3d 861, 380 N.E.2d 454 (1978).
4. 77 Ill. 2d at 66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
5. Id at 65-66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
6. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976);
Keene v. Keene, 57 Cal. 2d 657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962); Vallera v. Vallera, 21 Cal.
2d 681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943); Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932); Beckman v.
Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1974); In re Estate of Vargas, 36 Cal. App. 3d
714, 111 Cal. Rptr. 779 (1974); In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 826 (1973); Bridges
v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81
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dicial treatment of these cases covers a broad range from a strictly
"hands off" approach 7 to the provision of a forum for adjudication of
8
property rights.
The traditional view of contracts involving cohabitation as part of
the consideration is that such contracts are unenforceable. 9 This comes
from the position reflected in the Restatement of Contracts that "[a]
bargain in whole or in part for or in consideration of illicit sexual intercourse or a promise thereof is illegal."' 0 Therefore, "where a man and
woman have contracted with each other to cohabit illegally, a court will
not require the woman to perform her promise nor will it require the
man to pay for her services.""II
A stance frequently taken by courts faced with cohabitational
property rights problems is typified in Creasman v. Boyle.' 2 In Creasman, a man and woman lived together for years, and the woman managed the property acquired by the two of them. When she died, the
man discovered that all the property they had acquired was held in her
name. The Washington Supreme Court held that where the parties
were aware of the illegal character of their relationship, the court will
aid neither party and the property will belong to the one in whose
name it is found. 13 The Creasman court created a presumption that the
parties to a cohabitational relationship intended to hold and dispose of
the property just as they actually did.' 4
California has modified the harshness of the illegality rule by narrowing its scope. In Trutalli v. Aeraviglia,'5 a man and woman lived
together for eleven years and had two children. The woman claimed
(1977); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Carlson v. Olson, 256
N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977); Warren v. Warren, 579 P.2d 772 (Nev. 1978); Gauthier v. Laing, 96
N.H. 80, 70 A.2d 207 (1950); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979); McCall v.
Frampton, 418 N.Y.S.2d 752, 99 Misc. 2d 159 (1979); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507
(1978); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976); Hyman v. Hyman, 275 S.W.2d 149
(Tex. 1954); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977); Hinkle v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575
P.2d 711 (1978); In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972); West v. Knowles,
50 Wash. 2d 311, 311 P.2d 689 (1957); Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948);
Omer v. Omer, I1 Wash. App. 386, 523 P.2d 957 (1974).
7. See, e.g., Creasman v. Boyle, 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
8. See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976).
9. Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977); Gauthier v. Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 70
A.2d 207 (1950).
10. RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 589 (1932).
11. Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 543, 238 S.E.2d 81, 83 (1977) (Hill, J., dissenting).
12. 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948).
13. Id. at 351-52, 196 P.2d at 838-39. It is interesting to note that this is the only case which
this author has found where a man claimed a right to property acquired during a cohabitational
relationship.
14. Id at 353, 196 P.2d at 841.
15. 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d 430 (1932).
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that they had mutually agreed that she should perform all necessary
household services and that all property acquired by either was to be
held by the man for their joint benefit. The man claimed that the
agreement was unenforceable because it was based upon immoral consideration. The California Supreme Court found that an express agreement to pool earnings and share in joint accumulations of property was
a contract separate from the agreement to cohabit and was therefore
enforceable. 16
The broad scope of Trutalli was narrowed, however, by subsequent decisions. In Vallera v. Vallera,1 7 decided in 1943, the California
Supreme Court found that, absent an express agreement to share property, one party to a live-in relationship was entitled to share in the
other's property only to the extent that he or she could show monetary
contribution toward the acquisition of the property. In 1962, the court
in Keene v. Keene 18 went further, holding that a woman's services as
homemaker and helpmate did not give her any rights to property held
in her cohabitant's name, absent a cash contribution toward acquisition
of the property, because such services were presumed to be a gift.
These rules have been criticized because of their harshness. Traditionally, the woman's contribution to a cohabitational relationship has
been in the form of services as homemaker, and thus a double standard
was created.19 Although both parties knowingly entered into the relationship, the woman is punished because her contribution is frequently
in non-monetary form.20 Further, "[tihe rule often operates to the great
advantage of the cunning and shrewd, who wind up with possession of
the property or title to it in their names at the end of a so-called meretricious relationship. ' 21 While a court may proclaim that a "hands off"
approach will be used, the effect is to create a rule of law which aids the
"cunning, anticipatory designs of just one of the parties. ' 22
Because of inequities fostered by the traditional approaches, and
possibly in recognition of changing societal mores, the more recent decisions in California and other states have recognized property rights of
cohabitants. Because California has been in the forefront of this trend,
two California decisions merit examination.
The trend started in 1973 when a California appellate court
16.
17.
18.
19.

Id at 699,
21 Cal. 2d
57 Cal. 2d
Id. at 664,

20.

Id

12 P.2d at 431.
681, 134 P.2d 761 (1943).
657, 371 P.2d 329, 21 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1962).
371 P.2d at 336, 21 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (Peters, J., dissenting).

21. West v. Knowles, 50 Wash. 2d 311, 316, 311 P.2d 689, 693 (1957) (Finley, J., concurring).
22. Id
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decided In re Cary.23 The Carys lived together for eight years and had
four children. While both parties knew that they were not married,
they held themselves out to the community as married. The court held
that the Carys' relationship was that of a "family," thus coming within
the purview of the family law act. 24 The court found that California
community property law applied in the adjudication of their property
25
rights.
In 1976, the California Supreme Court decided the landmark case
of Marvin v. Marvin.2 6 Michelle Triola Marvin brought suit against
actor Lee Marvin for one-half of all the money he had earned during
their seven year live-in relationship. She alleged that he had promised
expressly to share with her all of his property acquired during their
relationship. The Marvin court recognized that the traditional approach to cohabitational property rights had led to inequitable results.
However, the court rejected the community property approach of Cary.
The court instead took a contract approach, holding that a contract
between unmarried cohabitants is "unenforceable only to the extent
that it explicitly rests upon the immoral and illicit consideration of meretricious sexual services. '"27 The court found that Michelle Marvin's
complaint stated a cause of action under an express oral contract, 28 reasoning that "adults who voluntarily live together and engage in sexual
relations are nonetheless as competent as any other persons to contract
respecting their earnings and property rights."' 29 Further, the court suggested other possible theories of recovery as acceptable: implied con32
31
tract, 30 implied partnership or joint venture, and quantum meruit.
The court reasoned that "the law should be fashioned to carry out the
reasonable expectations of the parties. ' 33 The California Supreme
Court then remanded the Marvin case to the trial court for a factual
34
determination based upon the court's holding.
23. 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 109 Cal. Rptr. 862 (1973).
24. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 4000-5138 (West 1978).
25. 34 Cal. App. 3d at 353, 109 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
26.
27.
28.

18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1979).
Id at 669, 557 P.2d at 112, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 821 (emphasis in original).
Id. at 674, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.

29. Id
30. Id at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831.
31. Id. See also In re Estate of Thornton, 81 Wash. 2d 72, 499 P.2d 864 (1972).
32. 18 Cal.3d at 684, 557 P.2d at 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 831. See also Hill v. Estate of West-

brook, 39 Cal. 2d 458, 462, 247 P.2d 19, 20 (1952); Gauthier v.Laing, 96 N.H. 80, 70 A.2d 207
(1950).
33. 18 Cal. 3d at 675, 557 P.2d at 116, 134 Cal. Rptr. at 825.
34. In a much publicized trial decision, Michele Triola Marvin was awarded $104,000 for
rehabilitation purposes under the trial court's power to fashion an equitable remedy. [19791 FAM.
LAW REP. (BNA) 3077.
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Since Marvin, a number of other states have faced the cohabitational property rights issue. The Oregon Supreme Court adopted the
express and implied contract theories of Marvin in Beal v. Beal.35 The
relevant inquiry in Beal was the intention of the parties. The Oregon
court noted that, absent an express written agreement, it must look at
the facts of the situation to see "what the parties implicitly agreed
upon. '36 The court determined that "joint acts of a financial nature
can give rise to an inference that the parties intended to share
equally. ' 37 Minnesota adopted Marvin's focus on the reasonable expectations of the parties when faced with a partition suit between a
couple who had cohabited for twenty-one years. 38 New Jersey 39 and
Utah 4° have adopted the express contract theory of Marvin as a basis of
recovery. New York has adopted the Marvin rationale with regard to
express and implied contracts. 4 t Only Georgia has denied any basis for
recovery. In a two-page opinion, the Georgia Supreme Court held that
the traditional contract illegality approach was applicable and the
42
court, therefore, denied any recovery.
HEwITT v HEWITT

Facts of the Case
Victoria Hewitt met the defendant, Robert Hewitt, in college in
Iowa.4 3 Victoria contends that when she became pregnant in 1960,
Robert told her that no formal marriage ceremony was necessary.
They would live together as husband and wife and he would share "his
life, his future earnings and his property with her. ....
,44 Victoria and
35. 282 Or. 115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978).
36. Id at 118, 577 P.2d at 510.
37. Id
38. Carlson v. Olson, 256 N.W.2d 249 (Minn. 1977). In Carlson, Laura Carlson petitioned
for partition of a house owned in joint tenancy with Oral Olson, who cross-petitioned claiming
that he had provided all the consideration for the purchase of the house. The court held that
Olson had intended an irrevocable gift to Carlson and therefore ordered partition. Id. at 255.
39. Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902 (1979) (recovery based upon express
oral agreement).
40. Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977) (recovery based upon express oral contract).
41. McCullon v. McCullon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1978) (recovery based upon Pennsylvania
common law marriage recognized by the New York court; court also recognized cause of action
based upon express or implied contract). But see McCall v. Frampton, 415 N.Y.S.2d 752, 99 Misc.
2d 159 (1979) (no cause of action because woman married to another man during period of cohabitation).
42. Rehak v. Mathis, 239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977). Faced with an eighteen-year
cohabitational relationship, the court in Rehak, with little analysis, held that any contract between
the parties was void because of illegal or immoral consideration.
43. 77 Ill. 2d at 53, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
44. Id
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Robert announced to their families that they were married. When
Robert entered dental school, he was financially assisted by Victoria's
parents. Victoria contends that she assisted defendant in his pedodontia 4 5 practice, for which she was paid. However, she placed those funds
in the family pool of earnings. After three children and fifteen years
together, the parties decided to end their relationship.
Victoria initially sued for divorce in Champaign County, Illinois.
When Robert moved to dismiss that action, she conceded that there
had not been a marriage ceremony. Since common law marriage is no
longer recognized under Illinois statute, 46 the divorce complaint was
dismissed. Victoria amended her complaint, requesting that the court
grant her "an equal share of the profits and properties accumulated by
the parties" 47 during their cohabitation. Her complaint gave the following four bases for recovery on her claim. First, that Robert's promise to "share . . . his earnings and property" with her was a contract
entitling her to one-half of all his property accumulated during their
"joint endeavors. ' 48 Second, the conduct of the parties evinced an implied contract. Third, because Robert fraudently assured Victoria that
they were married, his property should be impressed with a trust for
her benefit. Finally, Victoria argued that, since she relied upon Robert's promises to her detriment, Robert had been unjustly enriched. 49
Decisions of the Lower Courts
The trial court dismissed Victoria's amended complaint.5 0 The
court found that her complaint failed to state a cause of action because
Illinois law and public policy demanded that her claims be based upon
a valid legal marriage. 5' However, the court did find that Victoria was
52
entitled to child support.
The appellate court unanimously reversed the trial court. The
court, basing its decision upon the reasoning of Marvin, held that Vic45. Pedodontia is a specialized field of dentistry dealing only with children.
46. Illinois does not recognize common law marriages contracted in the state after 1905. ILL.
REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 214 (1979). Illinois courts have stated that they will recognize common law
marriages contracted in states which recognize them. Eg., Jambrone v. David, 16 Ill. 2d 32, 156
N.E.2d 569 (1959); Newton v. Lehman, 105 Ill. App. 2d 442, 244 N.E.2d 830 (1969).
47. 77 Ill. 2d at 52, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
48. Id at 53, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
49. Id
50. Id at 54, 394 N.E.2d at 1206.
51. Id
52. Id. The trial court found that it was unneccessary for Victoria to bring a separate action
under the Illinois Paternity Act, ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, §§ 1351-1368 (1979).
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toria had stated a cause of action based upon an express oral contract. 53
The court further stated that the theory of implied contract or equitable
relief based upon allegations of misrepresentations also might be avail54
able to Victoria.
The appellate court found that the Hewitts' relationship did not
violate public policy. 5" The court refused to characterize the relationship between Robert and Victoria as meretricious, 56 finding instead
that it was a stable, family relationship. 57 The relationship did not violate any criminal statutes. 58 The Illinois Criminal Code makes adultery an offense, 59 but in this case neither party had a living spouse. Nor
does the Illinois prohibition against fornication apply since that statute
states that any person who cohabits or has sexual intercourse with another not his spouse commits fornication if the behavior is open and
notorious.60 By judicial interpretation, the fornication statute applies
only when the behavior is "prominent, conspicuous and generally
known and recognized by the public, ' ' 6' but does not proscribe conduct
which is essentially private or discreet. 62 Thus, the appellate court
found that the Hewitts' conduct did not violate its interpretation of
public policy.
Finally, the appellate court rejected the concept of moral guilt as a
factor in its decision. The court stated, "[i]ndeed to the extent that denial of relief 'punishes' one partner, it necessarily rewards the other by
permitting him to retain a disproportionate amount of the property.
Concepts of 'guilt' thus cannot justify an unequal division of property
between two equally 'guilty' persons. '6 3 The court found the reasoning
of Marvin particularly persuasive because of the Hewitts' long term relationship. However, the court distinguished Marvin on its facts because Lee Marvin was married during three years of his cohabitation
53. Hewitt v. Hewitt, 62 I11.App. 3d 861, 867, 380 N.E.2d 454, 459 (1978).
54. Id at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459.
55. Id
56. Id at 863, 380 N.E.2d at 456-57. The court relied upon the 1973 edition of the NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY which defined meretricious as "of or relating to a prostitute." But see
Comment, Rights of the Putative andMeretricious Spouse in California,50 CAL. L. REV. 866, 873
(1962) which defines a meretricious spouse as "[o]ne who cohabitates with another knowing that
the relationship does not constitute a valid marriage ..
" The latter is the common legal definition. See, e.g., Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.w.2d 595 (1973).
57. 62 I11.App. 3d at 865, 380 N.E.2d at 457.
58. Id
59. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 11-7 (1979).
60. Id § 11-8(a) (emphasis added).
61. Illinois v. Cessna, 42 IU. App. 3d 746, 749, 356 N.E.2d 621, 623 (1976).
62. Illinois v. Potter, 319 I11.App. 409, 49 N.E.2d 307 (1943).
63. 62 IlI. App. 3d at 867, 380 N.E.2d at 459, citing Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 682,
557 P.2d 106, 121, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 830 (1976).
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with Michelle 64 which, in Illinois, would have been a criminal offense. 65 The appellate court focused upon whether the Hewitts' relationship violated public policy. When the court found that it did not, it
applied the full range of Marvin's reasoning to find a cause of action
for Victoria.
The Supreme Court Decision
On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
appellate court, finding "that the plaintiffs, claims are unenforceable
for the reason that they contravene the public policy implicit in the
statutory scheme of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage
Act, disfavoring the grant of mutually enforceable property rights to
'66
knowingly unmarried cohabitants.
The supreme court found the appellate court's reasoning flawed.
While relying upon the Marvin court's pure contract theory, the appellate court had emphasized the conventional family relationship. 67 The
supreme court questioned whether the appellate court felt that a stable
family relationship was a prerequisite to a Marvin theory of recovery.
The supreme court hesitated to decide property rights of cohabitants solely upon contract principles where broad policy questions were
involved. 68 While the appellate court focused upon whether the relationship had violated public policy, the supreme court focused upon
whether the granting of a cause of action would violate public policy.
The supreme court specifically looked at whether recognition of property rights between cohabitants would weaken the institution of marriage and whether judicial recognition of cohabitational property rights
69
would revive common law marriage.
The traditional rule in Illinois has been that "[an agreement in
' 70
consideration of future cohabitation between the plaintiffs is void."
The court noted, however, that "cohabitation by the parties may not
prevent them from forming valid contracts about independent matters,
for which it is said the sexual relations do not form part of the consideration."'7 ' The court rejected case law from other jurisdictions which
held that express agreements to pool earnings are supported by in64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

62 I11.
App. 3d at 865, 380 N.E.2d at 458.
See text accompanying note 59 supra.
77 I11.
2d at 66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
Id at 57, 394 N.E.2d at 1207.
Id at 57-58, 394 N.E.2d at 1207-08.
Id.
Id at 59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208, citing Wallace v. Rappleye, 103 Il.229, 249 (1882).
77 Ill. 2d at 59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208. See RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS §§ 589, 597
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dependent consideration and are not invalidated by the parties' cohabitation. 72 The court stated that it would be more candid to recognize
common law marriage than to display "the naivete we believe involved
in the assertion that there are involved in' these relationships contracts
separate and independent from the sexual activity, and the assumption
that those contracts would have been entered into or would continue
73

without that activity."

Because the facts alleged in this case clearly would have constituted a common law marriage under pre-1905 law, 74 the court found
that recognition of Victoria's property rights would have the effect of
resurrecting common law marriage. 75 The court noted that, even in
states where common law marriages are recognized, courts have questioned that policy, finding that common law marriage is a "fruitful
source of perjury and fraud" 76 and that it weakens the public estimate
of the sanctity of marriage. 77 The supreme court reasoned that, since
the legislature had abolished common law marriage, any change in the
status of common law marriages would have to come from the legisla78
ture.
The Hewitt court questioned whether it is appropriate to grant legal status to "a private arrangement substituting for the institution of
marriage sanctioned by the State."'79 The court found a strong legislative policy in favor of marriage, as expressed in the Illinois Marriage
and Dissolution of Marriage Act. The purpose of the act is to
"strengthen and preserve the integrity of marriage and safeguard fam(1932). Accord, Cougler v. Fackler, 510 S.W.2d 16 (Ky. 1974); Taylor v. Frost, 202 Neb. 652, 276
N.W.2d 656 (1979).
72. 77 I11. 2d at 59, 394 N.E.2d at 1208. See, e.g., Trutalli v. Meraviglia, 215 Cal. 698, 12 P.2d
430 (1932); Bridges v. Bridges, 125 Cal. App. 2d 359, 270 P.2d 69 (1954); Tyranski v. Piggins, 44
Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 80 N.J. 378, 403 A.2d 902
(1979); Latham v. Latham, 274 Or. 421, 547 P.2d 144 (1976).
73. 77 Ill. 2d at 60, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
74. Id at 63, 394 N.E.2d at 1210. The elements of common law marriage are an agreement
between a man and woman to take each other as husband and wife and to live together and
present themselves to the world as such. McKenna v. McKenna, 180 11. 577, 579-80, 54 N.E. 641,
642 (1899); Cartwright v. McGown, 121 Ill. 388 (1887); Port v. Port, 70 Ill. 484 (1873).
75. 77 Ill. 2d at 65-66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211. Accord, Reiland, Hewitt v. Hewitt: Middle
America, Marvinand Common Law Marriage,60 CHI. B. REC. 84, 90 (1978). However, the author
of this comment on the appellate court decision also observed that "on the facts presented, to deny
Victoria a cause of action would have been to reward Robert for the couple's failure to go through
a formal marriage ceremony."
76. Baker v. Mitchell, 143 Pa. Super. 50, 17 A.2d 738 (1941).
77. Sorensen v. Sorensen, 68 Neb. 483, 100 N.W. 930 (1904). For a general discussion of the
history of common law marriage, see In re Estate of Soeder, 7 Ohio App. 2d 271, 220 N.E.2d 547
(1966).
78. 77 Ill. 2d at 66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
79. Id at 61, 394 N.E.2d at 1209.
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ily relationships." 80 The court found this statement strengthened by
the fact that the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act retained the concept of fault as grounds for obtaining a divorce. The
marriage relationship thereby was prevented from becoming a "private
As further proof of a strong legislative
contract terminable at will.'
policy favoring marriage, the court cited the adoption of the concept of
the putative spouse who has legal status for only as long as he or she
has a good faith belief in the validity of the marriage. 82 The court saw
all of these factors as a legislative policy favoring marriage which
would be undermined by recognition of cohabitational property
83
rights.
ANALYSIS

In Hewitt, the court took a two-pronged approach to public policy. 84 The court feared that recognition of Victoria Hewitt's cause of
action would be equal to judicial recognition of common law marriage 8 5 and that recognition of the cause of action would weaken the
institution of marriage. 86 Both of these public policy arguments bear
examination.
The court saw a recognition of Victoria's claims as a form of judicial re-establishment of common law marriage which had been outlawed by the legislature. 87 However, the underlying basis of Victoria's
claims are substantially different from common law marriage. To
prove a common law marriage, it must be shown that the parties involved agreed to take each other as husband and wife and that they
88
lived together and presented themselves to the world as married.
Once these elements are established, the parties are treated by the
89
courts as married and are accorded the full range of marital rights.
80. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 102(2) (1979).
81. 77 11.2d at 64, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
82. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 305 (1979).
2d at 64-65, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
83. 77 I11.
84. Public policy can be found in the Constitution, laws, and the decisions of the courts.
United States v. Grace Evangelical Church, 132 F.2d 460 (7th Cir. 1943); Electrical Contractors
333, 63 N.E.2d 392 (1945); Zeigler v. Illinois Trust & Sav.
Ass'n v. Schulman Elec. Co., 391 Ill.
App. 3d 345, 292 N.E.2d 238
Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 91 N.E.1041 (1910); Bruno v. Gabhauer, 9 I11.
(1972).
85. 77 I11.
2d at 65-66, 394 N.E.2d at 1211.
86. Id at 64, 394 N.E.2d at 1210.
87. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 40, § 214 (1979).
577, 579-80, 54 N.E. 641, 642 (1899).
88. McKenna v. McKenna, 180 Ill.
89. See McCullon v. McCullon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1978). The court recognized a Pennsylvania common law marriage and therefore applied New York divorce law to award the woman
both alimony and a property settlement.

NOTES AND COMMENTS

The bases for Victoria's actions were pure contract theories rather than
marital rights theories. An express contract "is proven by an actual
agreement or by the expressed words used by the parties." 90 A contract
implied in fact is shown by looking at the acts and conduct of the parties to see if a contract is evinced. 9' When a contract is proven, the
parties do not gain rights outside those of the contract terms. 92 Thus,
while the remedy of a property settlement would be the same in this
case for both common law marriage and contract, the actions have a
different basis and can have differing consequences.
Contract theory has provided other states with an effective means
to adjudicate cohabitational property rights. Because only rarely are
the parties involved sophisticated enough to enter into express written
agreements, 93 courts have to look to the conduct of the parties to see
what they intended. Where parties have maintained separate financial
arrangements, courts have taken their conduct as evidence that they did
not intend to share in joint accumulations of property. 94 However,
where courts have found long term relationships with the parties pooling their finances, contract theory has provided a basis to grant recovery. 9 5 Thus, contract theory is flexible enough to avoid imposing
burdens upon those who live together but choose to keep their financial
affairs separate while it prevents inequities between those who agree to
pool their resources. Our society has created circumstances where cohabitation becomes advantageous. Because marriage would result in
loss of pension or social security benefits, many people choose cohabitation as an alternative. 96 Similarly, where marriage would result in an
increased federal income tax burden, cohabitation becomes an alternative.9 7 For these people, contract theory can be an aid to ordering their
financial affairs.
The supreme court reasoned that a recognition of cohabitational
90. In re Brumshagen's Estate, 27 I11.
App. 2d 14, 23, 169 N.E.2d 112, 116-17 (1960).
91. Anderson v. Biesman & Carrick Co., 287 Ill.
App. 507, 4 N.E.2d 639 (1936).
92. See City of Chicago v. Chicago Ry. Co., 228 I11.
App. 579 (1923).
93. Bruch, PropertyRights of De Facto Spouses Including Thoughts on the Value ofHomemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 102 (1976).
94. See Beckman v. Mayhew, 49 Cal. App. 3d 529, 122 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1974); Warren v.
Warren, 579 P.2d 772 (Nev. 1978); Hinkle v. McColm, 89 Wash. 2d 769, 575 P.2d 711 (1978).
95. See Tyranski v. Piggins, 44 Mich. App. 570, 205 N.W.2d 595 (1973); Beal v. Beal, 282 Or.
115, 577 P.2d 507 (1978); Edgar v. Wagner, 572 P.2d 405 (Utah 1977). Contra, Rehak v. Mathis,
239 Ga. 541, 238 S.E.2d 81 (1977).
96. See, e.g., Foster, MarriageandDivorce in the Twilight Zone, 17 ARIz. L. REV. 462, 471-72
(1975).
97. See Comment, PropertyRights Upon Termination of Unmarried Cohabitation: Marvin v.
Marvin, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1708, 1714 n.49 (1977). See generally Richards, DiscriminationAgainst
MarriedCouples Under Present Income Tax Laws, 49 TAXES 526 (1971).
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property rights would weaken the institution of marriage. However,
the policy set by the Hewitt court may have the effect of discouraging
marriage because of the rewards available to the income producing
party.9 8 There is no incentive for the income producing partner to
marry when, by not marrying, he can keep all the financial gains of the
joint relationship to himself. This policy appears to work against
strengthening the institution of marriage.
The essence of the supreme court's decision is to adopt a rule similar to that of Creasman v. Boyle,99 with the court aiding neither party
and the property belonging to the one in whose name it is found. However, the Creasman rule was based upon the fact that the cohabitational
relationship was illegal in the state of Washington. The Illinois
Supreme Court did not comment upon the finding of the appellate
court that the Hewitts' relationship had violated no Illinois laws. In
fact, the court studiously avoided any discussion of guilt. However,
guilt remains an underlying theme. By deciding that public policy prohibits judicial recognition of any property rights acquired during cohabitation, the court has created a rule which punishes one of the
parties and rewards the other. Both parties in this case are equally
guilty of participating in a meretricious relationship, yet the court has
rewarded Robert to Victoria's detriment.
The Hewitt court was not faced with the question of how it would
treat an express written contract between cohabitants. However, the
court's statement that it is naive to believe that contracts arising from
cohabitational relationships can be separate and independent from sexual activity 1°° appears to reject even written agreements in these cases.
This poses a definite hardship on Illinois residents who choose an alternative living arrangement. The logical extension of the Hewitt decision
is that people who choose to live together without marrying will have
few, if any, means to enforce their private economic agreements.
AVOIDING THE HEWITT RESULT

Joint ownership of property may be a viable alternative to a contractual agreement between cohabitants. Property could be held by co98. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 683, 557 P.2d 106, 122, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815, 831 (1979).
Accord, In re Cary, 34 Cal. App. 3d 345, 353, 109 Cal. Rtpr. 862, 866 (1973).
99. 31 Wash. 2d 345, 196 P.2d 835 (1948). See text accompanying notes 12-14 supra.
100. 77 Ill. 2d at 60, 394 N.E.2d at 1208-09. In contrast, it is interesting to note that a New
York court accepted as fact the assertion that during the last fifteen years of a twenty-eight year
cohabitational relationship, no sexual activity was a part of that relationship. McCullon v. McCullon, 410 N.Y.S.2d 226, 96 Misc. 2d 962 (1978).

NOTES AND COMMENTS

habitants either as tenants in common or as joint tenants with right of
survivorship.' 0 ' Trusts may be an additional alternative.
Under tenancy in common, each co-tenant holds an equal undivided interest in the whole property, 0 2 which could then be sold or
devised to another by will. 0 3 This form of joint ownership may be the
best means of holding property where the cohabitants wish to share
with one another while they both are alive but on the death of one of
them they wish the property to pass to someone other than the surviving cohabitant. For example, individuals who both have children from
a previous marriage or relationship may want to choose this form of
ownership so, at their death, each one's share of the property would
pass to his or her children.
Joint tenancy with right of survivorship is another alternative.
Each joint tenant holds an undivided one-half interest in the whole
property. 0 4 Upon the death of one of the joint tenants, the surviving
joint tenant then owns a fee simple interest in the entire property by
operation of law. 10 5 Where cohabitants wish to own property jointly
with each one's interest passing to the other at death, joint tenancy with
right of survivorship appears to be the best means of sharing property.
Cohabitation should not affect the parties' rights to jointly owned
property. The recent case of Edwards v. Miller'° supports this proposition. In Edwards, a couple cohabited for seventeen years, owning their
house in joint tenancy. When they parted, the man traded this piece of
property for another by obtaining the woman's signature through
fraud. The court impressed a constructive trust, finding that the trial
court properly had found the woman was a joint tenant in the property.10 7 In Hewitt, the appellate court noted that some of the Hewitts'
property was held in joint tenancy; 0 8 however, the supreme court decision dealt only with Victoria's claim against property held solely by
Robert. 10 9 Thus, it appears that cohabitation will not change the parties' rights to jointly owned property. Therefore, joint ownership provides a means of equitably sharing property acquired during a
cohabitational relationship.
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See ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 76, § 1-13 (1979).
Markoe v. Wakeman, 107 Ill. 251 (1883).
Mittel v. Karl, 133 Ill. 65, 24 N.E. 553 (1890).
In re Taggart's Estate, 15 IUl. App. 3d 1079, 305 N.E.2d 301 (1973).
Porter v. Porter, 381 Ill. 322, 45 N.E.2d 635 (1943).
61 IlL. App. 3d 1023, 378 N.E.2d 583 (1978).
Id at 1029, 378 N.E.2d at 588.
62 Ill. App. 3d at 861, 380 N.E.2d at 454-55.
77 I11.2d at 52, 394 N.E.2d at 1205.
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Another means for cohabitants to own and share property is by
means of a trust. The cohabitors could convey already acquired property into the trust or establish a trust and have the trust acquire property. Using a trust to hold and share property would provide
cohabitors with more flexibility than would jointly owned property.
The cohabitors could serve jointly as trustees" o and yet allocate the
beneficial interest in the trust to themselves in equal or unequal shares
as they wished. Rather than owning an undivided interest in a whole
piece of property by trust agreement, cohabitors could allocate specific
items of property to one or the other and therefore avoid partition
problems while as trustees they could keep control over their total
wealth. Thus, Illinois trust law appears to offer an alternative to contracts which cohabitors could use to order their financial affairs.
CONCLUSION

While the trend in other states has been to recognize that contract
or equitable principles may give rise to property rights between
cohabiting parties, the Illinois Supreme Court has gone in the other
direction. The court has found cohabitational property rights unenforceable because of a strong legislative policy in favor of marriage.
The supreme court feared that recognition of property rights in these
circumstances would weaken the institution of marriage and also be a
revival of common law marriage. The court left to the legislature the
question of what solutions, if any, should be authorized in situations
like this.
The Hewitt court, however, did not take note of the basic, underlying differences between contract theory and common law marriage.
Many other states have used contract theory to provide equitable results in these cases without imposing burdens on those who choose a
live-together life style. In light of the increase in cohabitational relationships, it is to be hoped that, at another time, the Illinois Supreme
Court or the Illinois legislature will see the matter in a different light.
CYNTHIA MCKEE HINMAN

110. Trustees may hold legal title as joint tenants and also be beneficiaries because their beneficial interest is held as tenants in common. Commercial Cas. Ins. v. North, 320 Ill. App. 221, 50
N.E.2d 434 (1943).

